Different notions of equivalence, such as the prominent notions of strong and uniform equivalence, have been studied in Answer-Set Programming, mainly for the purpose of identifying programs that can serve as substitutes without altering the semantics, for instance in program optimization. Such semantic comparisons are usually characterized by various selections of models in the logic of Hereand-There (HT). For uniform equivalence however, correct characterizations in terms of HT-models can only be obtained for finite theories, respectively programs. In this article, we show that a selection of countermodels in HT captures uniform equivalence also for infinite theories. This result is turned into coherent characterizations of the different notions of equivalence by countermodels, as well as by a mixture of HT-models and countermodels (so-called equivalence interpretations). Moreover, we generalize the so-called notion of relativized hyperequivalence for programs to propositional theories, and apply the same methodology in order to obtain a semantic characterization which is amenable to infinite settings. This allows for a lifting of the results to first-order theories under a very general semantics given in terms of a quantified version of HT. We thus obtain a general framework for the study of various notions of equivalence for theories under answer-set semantics. Moreover, we prove an expedient property that allows for a simplified treatment of extended signatures, and provide further results for non-ground logic programs. In particular, uniform equivalence coincides under open and ordinary answer-set semantics, and for finite non-ground programs under these semantics, also the usual characterization of uniform equivalence in terms of maximal and total HT-models of the grounding is correct, even for infinite domains, when corresponding ground programs are infinite.
Introduction
Answer-Set Programming (ASP) is a fundamental paradigm for nonmonotonic knowledge representation (Baral 2003 ) that encompasses logic programming under the answer-set semantics. It is distinguished by a purely declarative semantics and efficient solvers, such as, e.g., DLV (Leone et al. 2006) , Smodels (Simons et al. 2002) , clasp (Gebser et al. 2007 ), GnT (Janhunen and Niemelä 2004) , and ASSAT (Lin and Zhao 2004) . Initially providing a semantics for rules with default negation in the body, the answer-set semantics (or stablemodel semantics) (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1991) has been continually extended in terms of expressiveness and syntactic freedom. Starting with disjunctive rules, allowing for disjunctions in rule heads, negation in rule heads was considered and the development continued by allowing nested expressions, i.e., implication-free propositional formulas in the head and the body. Eventually, arbitrary propositional theories were given a non-classical minimal model semantics as their answer sets, which has recently been lifted to a general answer-set semantics for first-order theories .
In a different line of research, the restriction to Herbrand domains for programs with variables, i.e., non-ground programs, has been relaxed in order to cope with open domains (Heymans et al. 2007) , which is desirable for certain applications, e.g., in conceptual modelling and Semantic Web reasoning. The resulting open answer-set semantics has been further generalized by dropping the unique names assumption (Heymans et al. 2008) for application settings where it does not apply, for instance, when combining ontologies with nonmontonic rules (de Bruijn et al. 2007 ).
As for a logical characterization of the answer-set semantics, the logic of Here-andThere (HT), a nonclassical logic extending intuitionistic logic, served as a basis. Equilibrium Logic selects certain minimal HT-models for characterizing the answer-set semantics for propositional theories and programs. It has recently been extended to Quantified Equilibrium Logic (QEL) for first-order theories on the basis of a quantified version of Here-and-There (QHT) (Pearce and Valverde 2006; Pearce and Valverde 2008) . Equilibrium Logic serves as a viable formalism for the study of semantic comparisons of theories and programs, like different notions of equivalence Lifschitz et al. 2007; Woltran 2008; Faber and Konczak 2006; Faber et al. 2008; Inoue and Sakama 2004) . The practical relevance of this research originates in program optimization tasks that rely on modifications that preserve certain properties Lin and Chen 2007; Janhunen et al. 2009; Janhunen 2008; Sakama and Inoue 2009) .
In previous work (Fink 2008) , we complemented this line of research by solving an open problem concerning uniform equivalence of propositional theories and programs. Intuitively, two propositional logic programs are uniformly equivalent if they have the same answer sets under the addition of an arbitrary set of atoms to both programs. Former characterizations of uniform equivalence, i.e., selections of HT-models based on a maximality criterion ), failed to capture uniform equivalence for infinite propositional programs-a problem that becomes relevant when turning to the non-ground setting, respectively first-order theories, where infinite domains, such as the natural numbers, are encountered in many application domains. In (Fink 2008) , this has been remedied resorting to countermodels in HT.
In this article, we extend the former work beyond the basic notions of strong and uniform equivalence. So-called relativized notions thereof have been considered in order to capture more fine-grained semantical comparisons (see e.g., Pearce et al. 2007) ). Intuitively, these notions restrict the alphabet to be considered for potential additions, i.e., programs or sets of facts, respectively. A further refinement distinguishes the alphabet for atoms allowed in rule heads of an addition from the alphabet for atoms allowed in rule bodies (Woltran 2008) . The various notions of equivalence that can be formalized this way have recently been called relativized hyperequivalence (Truszczynski and Woltran 2008a; Truszczynski and Woltran 2008b) .
Similarly as for uniform equivalence, semantic characterizations of relativized hyperequivalence have been obtained by means of a maximality criterion so far, and only for finite propositional settings. We address this issue and apply the same methods as for uniform equivalence in order to obtain alternative characterizations. They can be stated without any finiteness restrictions and easily lift to first-order settings over infinite domains.
The new contributions compared to (Fink 2008) can be summarized as follows:
• We provide full proofs for the characterizations of uniform equivalence, but also classical equivalence, answer-set equivalence, and strong equivalence, in terms of countermodels in HT, respectively in terms of equivalence interpretations, developed in (Fink 2008 ).
• We extend these ideas to relativized settings of equivalence and generalize the notion of relativized hyperequivalence to propositional theories. Abstracting from the notions of rule head and rule body, we obtain respective notions of relativization for theories. We provide novel semantical characterizations in terms of equivalence interpretations for this generalized setting, again without any finiteness restrictions.
• We lift these results to first-order theories by means of QHT, essentially introducing, besides uniform equivalence, relativized hyperequivalence for first-order theories under the most general form of answer-set semantics currently considered.
• We correct an informal claim that has been made in connection with a property which allows for a simplified treatment of extended signatures and holds for QHT countermodels. Based on an erroneous example (Example 5 in (Fink 2008) ), it was claimed that this property does not hold for QHT-models, which is not the case.
• Eventually, we reconsider logic programs and prove, using the established characterization, that uniform equivalence coincides for open and ordinary answer-set semantics, as well as other results which have been stated without proof in (Fink 2008) .
Our results provide an elegant, uniform model-theoretic framework for the characterization of the different notions of equivalence considered in ASP. They generalize to firstorder theories without finiteness restrictions, and are relevant for practical ASP systems that handle finite non-ground programs over infinite domains.
In particular relativized notions of equivalence are relevant in practice. For instance, program composition from modular parts is an issue of increasing interest in ASP (Dao-Tran et al. 2009; Janhunen et al. 2009 ). It usually hinges on semantic properties specified for an interface (input/output for 'calling' or connecting modules), i.e., properties that require compliance on a subset of the underlying language. Our results might be exploited to provide correctness guarantees for specific compositions.
Another benefit comes with the generalization to first-order theories. It facilitates and simplifies the study of combinations of ASP with other formalisms, or means for external data access, in a unifying formalism. Especially the combination of nonmonotonic rules with description logics is a highly relevant instance of such a combination. Our results can initiate or reduce difficulties in the study of modularity and optimization for such combined settings. (cf. (Fink and Pearce 2009 ) for preliminary work in this direction).
For the sake of presentation, the technical content is split into two parts, discussing the propositional case first, and addressing first-order theories and nonground programs in a second part. In particular, the organization is as follows: Section 2 introduces essential preliminaries for the treatment of the propositional case. In Section 3, we develop a characterization of uniform equivalence by means of countermodels in HT, and proceed with an alternative characterization in terms of equivalence interpretations, before we turn to generalizing and characterizing relativized hyperequivalence for propositional theories. After some introductory background on quantified HT, Section 4 deals with generalizations of previous results to first-order theories under generalized answer-set semantics. In Section 5, we apply our characterization of uniform equivalence to logic programs under various extended semantics in comparison with the traditional semantics over Herbrand domains, before we draw some conclusions in Section 6.
Preliminaries
We start with the propositional setting and briefly summarize the necessary background. Corresponding first-order formalisms will be introduced when discussing first-order theories, respectively non-ground logic programs.
Propositional Here-and-There
In the propositional case we consider formulas of a propositional signature L, i.e., a set of propositional variables, and the connectives ∧, ∨, →, and ⊥ for conjunction, disjunction, implication, and falsity, respectively. Furthermore we make use of the following abbreviations: φ ≡ ψ for (φ → ψ) ∧ (ψ → φ); ¬φ for φ → ⊥; and ⊤ for ⊥ → ⊥. A formula is said to be factual 1 if it is built using ∧, ∨, ⊥, and ¬ (i.e., implications of the form φ → ⊥), only. A theory Γ is factual if every formula of Γ has this property. The logic of here-and-there is an intermediate logic between intuitionistic logic and classical logic. Like intuitionistic logic it can be semantically characterized by Kripke models, in particular using just two worlds, namely "here" and "there" (assuming that the here world is ordered before the there world). Accordingly, interpretations (HT-interpretations) are pairs (X, Y ) of sets of atoms from L, such that X ⊆ Y . An HT-interpretation is total if X = Y . The intuition is that atoms in X (the here part) are considered to be true, atoms not in Y (the there part) are considered to be false, while the remaining atoms (from Y \X) are undefined.
We denote classical satisfaction of a formula φ by an interpretation X, i.e., a set of atoms, as X |= φ, whereas satisfaction in the logic of here-and-there (an HT-model), symbolically (X, Y ) |= φ, is defined recursively:
An HT-interpretation (X, Y ) satisfies a theory Γ, iff it satisfies all formulas φ ∈ Γ. For an axiomatic proof system see, e.g., .
A
We will make use of the following simple properties: if (X, Y ) |= Γ then (Y, Y ) |= Γ; and (X, Y ) |= ¬φ iff Y |= ¬φ; as well as of the following lemma.
Lemma 1 (Lemma 5 in (Pearce and Valverde 2004) ) If φ is a factual propositional formula, (X, Y ) |= φ, and
Propositional Logic Programming
A (disjunctive) rule r is of the form
where a 1 , . . . , a l , b 1 , . . . , b n are atoms of a propositional signature L, such that l ≥ k ≥ 0, n ≥ m ≥ 0, and l + n > 0. We refer to "¬" as default negation. The head of r is the set H(r) = {a 1 , . . . , a k , ¬a k+1 , . . . , ¬a l }, and the body of r is denoted by B(r) = {b 1 , . . . , b m , ¬b m+1 , . . . , ¬b n }. Furthermore, we define the sets H + (r) = {a 1 , . . . , a k },
An interpretation I, i.e., a set of atoms, satisfies a rule r, symbolically I |= r, iff I ∩ H + (r) = ∅ or H − (r) ⊆ I, if B + (r) ⊆ I and B − (r)∩I = ∅. Adapted from (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1991) , the reduct of a program Π with respect to an interpretation I, symbolically Π I , is given by the set of rules
An interpretation I is called an answer set of Π iff I |= Π I and it is subset minimal among the interpretations of L with this property.
Notions of Equivalence
For any two theories, respectively programs, and a potential extension by Γ, we consider the following notions of equivalence which have been shown to be the only forms of equivalence obtained by varying the logical form of extensions in the propositional case in (Pearce and Valverde 2004) .
Definition 1
Two theories Γ 1 , Γ 2 over L are called
• classically equivalent, Γ 1 ≡ c Γ 2 , if and only if they have the same classical models;
• answer-set equivalent, Γ 1 ≡ a Γ 2 , if and only if they have the same answer sets, i.e., equilibrium models;
Emanating from a logic programming setting, uniform equivalence is usually understood wrt. sets of facts (i.e., atoms). Obviously, uniform equivalence wrt. factual theories implies uniform equivalence wrt. sets of facts. The converse direction has been shown as well for general propositional theories (cf. Theorem 2 in (Pearce and Valverde 2004) ). Therefore, in general there is no difference whether uniform equivalence is considered wrt. sets of facts or factual theories. The latter may be regarded as facts, i.e., rules with an empty body, of so-called nested logic program rules. One might also consider sets of disjunctions of atomic formulas and their negations (i.e., clauses), accounting for facts according to the definition of program rules in this article. Note that clauses constitute factual formulas and the classical transformation of clauses into implications is not valid under answer set semantics (respectively in HT).
Equivalence of Propositional Theories by HT-Countermodels
Uniform equivalence is usually characterized by so-called UE-models, i.e., total and maximal non-total HT-models, which fail to capture uniform equivalence for infinite propositional theories.
Example 1 ( )) Let Γ 1 and Γ 2 over L = {a i | i ≥ 1} be the following propositional theories
Both, Γ 1 and Γ 2 , have the single total HT-model (L, L). Furthermore, Γ 1 has no non-total HT-model (X, L), i.e, such that X ⊂ L, while Γ 2 has the non-total HT-models (X i , L), where X i = {a 1 , . . . , a i } for i ≥ 0. Both theories have the same total and maximal nontotal (namely none) HT-models. But they are not uniformly equivalent as witnessed by the fact that (L, L) is an equilibrium model of Γ 1 but not of Γ 2 .
The reason for this failure is the inability of the concept of maximality to capture differences exhibited by an infinite number of HT-models.
HT-Countermodels
The above problem can be avoided by taking HT-countermodels that satisfy a closure condition instead of the maximality criterion.
Definition 2
An HT-interpretation (X, Y ) is an HT-countermodel of a theory Γ if (X, Y ) |= Γ. The set of HT-countermodels of a theory Γ is denoted by C s (Γ).
Intuitively, an HT-interpretation fails to be an HT-model of a theory Γ when the theory is not satisfied at one of the worlds (here or there). Note that satisfaction at the there world amounts to classical satisfaction of the theory by Y . A simple consequence is that if Y |= Γ, then (X, Y ) is an HT countermodel of Γ for any X ⊆ Y . At the here world, classical satisfaction is a sufficient condition but not necessary. For logic programs, satisfaction at the here world is precisely captured by the reduct of the program Π wrt. the interpretation at the there world, i.e., if X |= Π Y .
Definition 3
A set S of HT-interpretations is total-closed, if every total HT-interpretation (Y, Y ) ∈ S is total-closed in S. By the remarks on the satisfaction at the there world above, it is obvious that every total HT-countermodel of a theory is also total-closed in C s (Γ). Consequently, C s (Γ) is a total-closed set for any theory Γ. By the same argument, if (X, Y ) is an HT-countermodel such that X ⊂ Y and Y |= Γ, then (X, Y ) is closed in C s (Γ). The more relevant cases concerning the characterization of equivalence are HT-countermodels (X, Y ) such that Y |= Γ.
Example 2
Consider the theory Γ 1 in Example 1 and a non-total HT-interpretation (X, L). Since (X, L) is non-total, X ⊂ L holds, and therefore (X, L) |= a i , for some a i ∈ L. Thus, we have identified a HT-countermodel of Γ 1 . Moreover the same argument holds for any non-total HT-interpretation of the from (X ′ , L) (in particular such that
The intuition that, essentially, there-closed countermodels can be used instead of maximal non-total HT-models for characterizing uniform equivalence draws from the following observation. If (X, Y ) is a maximal non-total HT-model, then every (X ′ , Y ), such that X ⊂ X ′ ⊂ Y , is a there-closed HT-countermodel. However, there-closed HTcountermodels are not sensitive to the problems that infinite chains cause for maximality. Given a theory Γ, let C u (Γ) denote the set of there-closed HT-interpretations in C s (Γ).
Theorem 1
Two propositional theories Γ 1 , Γ 2 are uniformly equivalent iff they have the same sets of there-closed HT-countermodels, in symbols
Proof
For the only-if direction, assume that two theories, Γ 1 and Γ 2 , are uniformly equivalent. Then they are classically equivalent, i.e., they coincide on total HT-models, and therefore also on total HT-countermodels. Since a total HT-interpretation
is an HT-model of Γ, this proves that Γ 1 and Γ 2 coincide on total HT-interpretations that are there-closed in C s (Γ 1 ), respectively in C s (Γ 2 ). To prove our claim, it remains to show that Γ 1 and Γ 2 coincide on non-total thereclosed HT-countermodels (X, Y ), i.e., such that (Y, Y ) is an HT-model of both theories. Consider such a there-closed HT-countermodel of
is an answer set of Γ 1 ∪ X and, by hypothesis since X is factual, it is also an answer set of Γ 2 ∪ X. The latter implies for all
these HT-interpretations are HT-models of X. Therefore we conclude that they all are HTcountermodels of Γ 2 and hence (X, Y ) is a there-closed HT-countermodel of Γ 2 . Again by symmetric arguments, we establish the same for any there-closed HT countermodel (X, Y ) of Γ 2 such that (Y, Y ) is a common total HT-model. This proves that Γ 1 and Γ 2 have the same sets of there-closed HT countermodels. For the if direction, assume that two theories, Γ 1 and Γ 2 , have the same sets of thereclosed HT-countermodels. This implies that they have the same total HT-models (since these are there-closed). Consider any factual theory Γ ′ such that Y is an answer set of
′ this is trivial, and in particular the case if (X, Y ) |= Γ 1 . So let us consider the case where (X, Y ) |= Γ 1 and (X, Y ) |= Γ ′ . By Lemma 1 we conclude from the latter that,
The argument with Γ 1 and Γ 2 interchanged, proves that Y is an
and Γ 2 ∪ Γ ′ coincide for any factual Γ ′ , i.e., Γ 1 and Γ 2 are uniformly equivalent.
Example 3
Reconsider the theories in Example 1. Every non-total HT-interpretation (X i , L) is an HTcountermodel of Γ 1 , and thus, each of them is there-closed in C s (Γ 1 ). On the other hand, none of these HT-interpretations is an HT-countermodel of Γ 2 . Therefore, Γ 1 and Γ 2 are not uniformly equivalent.
Countermodels have the drawback however, that they cannot be characterized directly in HT itself, i.e., as the HT-models of a 'dual' theory. The usage of "dual" here is nonstandard compared to its application to particular calculi or consequence relations, but it likewise conveys the idea of a dual concept. In this sense HT therefore is non-dual:
Proposition 1
Given a theory Γ, in general there is no theory Γ ′ such that (X, Y ) is an HT-countermodel of Γ iff it is a HT-model of Γ ′ , for any HT-interpretation (X, Y ).
Proof
As observed in (Cabalar and Ferraris 2007) , any theory has a total-closed set of countermodels. Consider the theory Γ = {a} and suppose there exists a theory
Because any theory has a total-closed set of countermodels, it follows that
hence, an HT-model of Γ. Contradiction.
Characterizing Equivalence by means of Equivalence Interpretations
The characterization of countermodels by a theory in HT essentially fails due to total HTcountermodels. However, total HT-countermodels of a theory are not necessary for characterizing equivalence, in the sense that they can be replaced by total HT-models of the theory for this purpose.
Definition 5
An HT-interpretation is an equivalence interpretation of a theory Γ if it is a total HT-model of Γ or a here-countermodel of Γ. The set of equivalence interpretations of a theory Γ is denoted by E s (Γ).
Theorem 2
Two theories Γ 1 and Γ 2 coincide on their HT-countermodels iff they have the same equivalence interpretations, symbolically
Proof
For the only-if direction, assume that two theories, Γ 1 and Γ 2 , have the same sets of HTcountermodels. This implies that they have the same here-countermodels. Furthermore, since the total HT-countermodels are equal, they also coincide on total HT-models. Consequently, Γ 1 and Γ 2 have the same equivalence interpretations. For the if direction, assume that two theories, Γ 1 and Γ 2 , coincide on their equivalence interpretations. Then they have the same total HT-models and hence the same total HTcountermodels. Since total HT-countermodels of every theory are total-closed in the set of HT-countermodels, the sets of HT-countermodels coincide on all HT-interpretations (X, Y ) such that (Y, Y ) is a (total) HT countermodel. All remaining HT-countermodels are here-countermodels and therefore coincide by hypothesis and the definition of equivalence interpretations. This proves the claim.
As a consequence of this result, and the usual relationships on HT-models, we can characterize equivalences of propositional theories also by selections of equivalence interpretations, i.e., a mixture of non-total here-countermodels and total HT-models, such that the characterizations, in particular for uniform equivalence, are also correct for infinite theories.
Definition 6
Given a theory Γ, we denote by
, and by E a (Γ) the set of total-closed HT-interpretations in E s (Γ) (i.e., equilibrium models);
By means of the above sets of HT-countermodels, respectively equivalence interpretations, equivalences of propositional theories can be characterized as follows.
Corollary 1
Given two propositional theories Γ 1 and Γ 2 , the following propositions are equivalent for e ∈ {c, a, s, u}:
Example 4
In our running example,
, by the remarks on non-total HT-interpretations in Example 3.
Since equivalence interpretations do not encompass total HT-countermodels, we attempt a direct characterization in HT.
Lemma 2 For any HT-interpretation
The latter is a tautology, and
By means of this lemma, we can use formulas of the form ¬¬a → a to ensure for a given formula φ of Γ that if (X, Y ) |= φ then X = Y , i.e., that the HT-interpretation is total.
Proposition 2
Let M be an HT-interpretation over L. Then, M ∈ E s (Γ) for a theory Γ iff M |= Γ φ for some φ ∈ Γ, where Γ φ = {¬¬ψ | ψ ∈ Γ} ∪ {φ → (¬¬a → a) | a ∈ L}.
Proof
For the only-if direction, assume (X, Y ) is an equivalence interpretation of Γ. Then Y |= ψ for all ψ ∈ Γ and therefore (X, Y ) |= ¬¬ψ for all ψ ∈ Γ. If X = Y , then by Lemma 2, (X, Y ) also satisfies ¬¬a → a for all a ∈ L. In this case, (X, Y ) |= Γ φ for all φ ∈ Γ. We continue with the case where
For infinite propositional theories, we thus end up with a characterization of equivalence interpretations as the union of the HT-models of an infinite number of (infinite) theories. At least for finite theories, however, a characterization in terms of a (finite) theory is obtained (even for a potentially extended infinite signature).
If
proves the claim for total HT-countermodels, and since HT countermodels are total-closed, for any
We continue with the case that
This eventually enables the characterization of the HT-countermodels of a finite theory by another finite theory, as stated in the next result.
Theorem 3
Let Γ be a finite theory over L, and let M be an HT-interpretation.
For the if direction, consider any HT-interpretation M such that M | L satisfies the theory
Example 5 Let Γ = {a} over L = {a} and recall what the proof of Proposition 1 established: There is no theory Γ ′ such that (X, Y ) is an HT-model of Γ ′ iff it is an HT-countermodel of Γ. According to Theorem 3 however, we can characterize E s (Γ) by means of totalitypreserving HT-models of the theory
is a totality-preserving HT-model of Γ ′ iff a ∈ Y and either X = Y or a ∈ X. These interpretations respectively correspond to the total models and the here-countermodels, i.e., the equivalence interpretations of Γ over L ′ .
Relativized Hyperequivalence for Propositional Theories
We now turn to the notion of relativized hyperequivalence. The term 'hyperequivalence' has been coined in the context of ASP, as a general expression for different forms of equivalence, which guarantee that the semantics is preserved under the addition of arbitrary programs (called contexts) from a particular class of programs (Truszczynski and Woltran 2008a) . Relativized hyperequivalence emanates from the study of relativized notions of equivalence by restricting contexts to particular alphabets (see e.g., Pearce et al. 2007) ). It has been generalized to the setting, where possibly different alphabets are used to restrict the head atoms and the body atoms allowed to appear in context rules (Woltran 2008) . While up to now relativized hyperequivalence has only been studied for finite programs, we aim at a generalization of relativized hyperequivalence for propositional theories under the answer-set semantics, without any finiteness restrictions. For this purpose, we first generalize the notions of 'head atom' and 'body atom' for theories.
The occurrence of an atom a in a formula φ is called positive if φ is implication free, if a occurs in the consequent of an implication in φ, or if φ is of the form (φ 1 → φ 2 ) → φ 3 and a occors in φ 1 . An occurrence of a is called negative if a occurs in the antecedent of an implication. The notion of positive and negative occurrence is extended to (sub-)formulas in the obvious way. Note that any occurrence under negation therefore is a negative occurrence, and that the occurrence of an atom or subformula may be both positive and negative, for instance the occurrence of b in a → (b → ⊥), viz. a → ¬b. By means of these notions, relativized hyperequivalence for propositional theories can be expressed as follows, which is a proper generalization of the logic programming setting.
A propositional theory Γ over

Definition 7
Two propositional theories Γ 1 , Γ 2 over L are called relativized hyperequivalent wrt. A + and A − , symbolically Γ 1
Towards a characterization of relativized hyperequivalence, our goal is to follow the same methodology that we used to characterize uniform equivalence, i.e., resorting to HTcountermodels and respective closure conditions. However, while in the logic programming setting such closure conditions may be obtained from certain monotonicity properties of the program reduct, we first have to establish corresponding properties for theories. A first property in this respect is the following. Note that although the next result is stated for extended A + -A − -theories (for reasons which will become clear later), it trivially also holds for any (non-extended) A + -A − -theory.
Proposition 4
Consider an extended propositional A + -A − -theory Γ, and an HT-interpretation (X, Y ).
e., any formula that has positive occurrences of atoms from A + , and negative occurrences of atoms from A − , only. We show by induction on the formula structure of φ, that for all
For the base case, consider any atomic formula φ, and suppose first that (a) the occurrence of φ is a positive occurrence. Then, (X, Y ) |= φ implies that φ is not ⊥, and thus is an atom a from A + such that a ∈ X.
we conclude that a ∈ X ′ . Hence, (X ′ , Y ) |= φ. Suppose (b) φ is a negative occurrence. If (X, Y ) |= φ, then either φ is ⊥, and (X ′ , Y ) |= φ follows trivially. Otherwise, φ is an atom
This proves (a) and (b) for atomic formulas.
For the induction step, assume that (a) and (b) hold for any A + -A − -formula of connective nesting depth n − 1, and let φ be a formula of connective nesting depth n. Consider the case where φ is of the form φ 1 ∧ φ 2 , respectively φ 1 ∨ φ 2 . If φ is a positive occurrence (a), then so are φ 1 and φ 2 , both of connective nesting depth depth n − 1. From (X, Y ) |= φ we conclude (X, Y ) |= φ 1 and (or) (X, Y ) |= φ 2 . The induction hypothesis applies, proving
In case φ is a negative occurrence (b), then so are φ 1 and φ 2 , both of connective nesting depth n − 1. Then, (X, Y ) |= φ implies (X, Y ) |= φ 1 or (and) (X, Y ) |= φ 2 , and the same holds for any
Finally, let φ be of the form φ 1 → φ 2 . Then, independent of whether φ occurs positively or negatively, φ 1 is a negative occurrence and φ 2 is a positive occurrence, both of connective nesting depth n − 1. First, suppose that φ is a positive occurrence (a), as well as that (X, Y ) |= φ. Towards a contradiction assume that there exists
plies that Y |= φ, we conclude that both, (X ′ , Y ) |= φ 1 and (X ′ , Y ) |= φ 2 , hold. From the latter, since φ 2 is a positive occurrence of connective nesting depth n − 1, it follows that (X, Y ) |= φ 2 (otherwise by induction hypothesis (a) (X ′ , Y ) |= φ 2 ). This implies (X, Y ) |= φ 1 since (X, Y ) |= φ. However, φ 1 is a negative occurrence of connective nesting depth n − 1, thus by induction hypothesis (b) we conclude that (X ′ , Y ) |= φ 1 , a contradiction. Therefore, (X ′ , Y ) |= φ for all X ′ under consideration, which proves (a). For (b), let φ be a negative occurrence and suppose
In case Y |= φ, we conclude that (X, Y ) |= φ 1 and (X, Y ) |= φ 2 . Since φ is a negative occurrence, not only φ 1 but also φ 2 is a negative occurrence, both of connective nesting depth n − 1. Therefore, by induction hypothesis (b) we conclude that (X ′ , Y ) |= φ 2 . Moreover, also because φ is a negative occurrence, φ 1 is a positive occurrence as well. Hence, by induction hypothesis (a) we
ation. This concludes the inductive argument and proves (a) and (b) for A + -A − -formulas of arbitrary connective nesting. Next, we turn to factual formulas ψ in Γ, and prove by induction on the formula structure of ψ, that
For the base case, consider any atomic formula ψ, and suppose first that (c) (
Then ψ is ⊥ or ψ is a an atom not in Y . In the former case, (X ′ , Y ) |= ψ follows trivially for all X ′ ⊆ Y . In the latter case, the atom also cannot be a member of any
This proves (c) and (d) for atomic formulas.
For the induction step, assume that (c) and (d) hold for any factual formula of connective nesting depth n − 1, and let ψ be a factual formula of connective nesting depth n. Consider the case where ψ is of the form ψ 1 ∧ ψ 2 , respectively ψ 1 ∨ ψ 2 . Since ψ is factual, so are ψ 1 and ψ 2 , both of connective nesting depth depth n − 1. In case (c), from (X, Y ) |= ψ we conclude (X, Y ) |= ψ 1 and (or) (X, Y ) |= ψ 2 . The induction hypothesis applies,
Finally, let ψ be of the form ψ 1 → ⊥. Then, ψ 1 is factual and of connective nesting depth depth n − 1. In case (c), Concerning the claim of the proposition, since (X, Y ) |= Γ implies (X, Y ) |= φ and (X, Y ) |= ψ, for every A + -A − -formula φ in Γ and every factual formula ψ in Γ, we
Complementary to this result, given a total HT-model of an (extended) A + -A − -theory, we can infer its satisfaction for the following class of non-total HT-interpretations.
Proposition 5
Consider an extended propositional A + -A − -theory Γ, and a total HT-interpretation (Y, Y ).
Proof Consider any A + -A − -formula φ in Γ, i.e., any formula that has positive occurrences of atoms from A + , and negative occurrences of atoms from A − , only. We show by induction on the formula structure of φ, that for all
For the base case, consider any atomic formula φ, and suppose first (a) that φ is a positive occurrence such that (Y, Y ) |= φ. Then φ is not ⊥, and thus is an atom a from
For the induction step, assume that (a) and (b) hold for any A + -A − -formula of connective nesting depth n − 1, and let φ be a formula of connective nesting depth n. Consider the case where φ is of the form φ 1 ∧ φ 2 , respectively φ 1 ∨ φ 2 . If φ is a positive occurrence (a), then so are φ 1 and φ 2 , both of connective nesting depth depth n − 1.
i.e., (X ′ , Y ) |= φ for all X ′ under consideration. In case φ is a negative occurrence (b), then so are φ 1 and φ 2 , both of connective nesting depth n − 1. Then, (Y, Y ) |= φ implies (Y, Y ) |= φ 1 or (and) (Y, Y ) |= φ 2 , and the same holds for any (X ′ , Y ) under consideration by induction hypothesis. This proves (X ′ , Y ) |= φ. Finally, let φ be of the form φ 1 → φ 2 . Then, independent of whether φ occurs positively or negatively, φ 1 is a negative occurrence and φ 2 is a positive occurrence, both of connective nesting depth n − 1. First, suppose (Y, Y ) |= φ. Towards a contradiction assume that there exists X ′ ⊆ Y such that 
However, φ 1 is a negative occurrence of connective nesting depth n − 1, thus by induction hypothesis (b) we conclude that (X ′ , Y ) |= φ 1 , a contradiction. Therefore, (X ′ , Y ) |= φ for all X ′ under consideration, which proves (a). For (b), let φ be a negative occurrence
ation. This concludes the inductive argument and proves (a) and (b) for A + -A − -formulas of arbitrary connective nesting. Next, we turn to factual formulas ψ in Γ, and prove by induction on the formula structure
For the base case, consider any atomic formula ψ, and suppose that
For the induction step, assume that the claim holds for any factual formula of connective nesting depth n − 1, and let ψ be a factual formula of connective nesting depth n. Consider the case where ψ is of the form ψ 1 ∧ ψ 2 , respectively ψ 1 ∨ ψ 2 . Since ψ is factual, so are ψ 1 and ψ 2 , both of connective nesting depth depth n − 1.
for all X ′ under consideration. Finally, let ψ be of the form ψ 1 → ⊥. Then, ψ 1 is factual and of connective nesting depth depth n − 1.
, (Y, Y ) |= ψ 1 and by Case (d) in the proof of Proposition 4, the same holds for any
This concludes the inductive argument and proves the claim for factual formulas over A + of arbitrary connective nesting.
Concerning the claim of the proposition, since
This proves (X ′ , Y ) |= Γ, for all X ′ under consideration.
Having established these properties of A + -A − -theories, we can state respective closure conditions for HT-interpretations referring to countermodels, or which we consider more convenient here, referring to equivalence interpretations.
Definition 8 Given a propositional theory Γ over L, sets of propositional variables
and an HT-interpretation (X, Y ), we say that
With these concepts, a semantic characterization of relativized hyperequivalence for propositional theories can be established by means of the following characteristic equivalence interpretations.
Definition 9 An HT-interpretation (X, Y ) is an HT-hyperequivalence interpretation wrt. A
+ and A − of a propositional theory Γ iff (Y, Y ) is A + -total and there exists an HT-interpretation
The set of HT-hyperequivalence interpretations wrt. A + and A − of a propositional theory Γ is denoted by E
This definition intuitively generalizes the characterization of Woltran (2008) for the logic programming setting to propositional theories. Note however, that rather than resorting to HT-models and a maximality criterion, the above definition refers to equivalence interpretations (i.e., HT-countermodels in case of non-totality) and respective closure conditions. As in the case of uniform equivalence, this not only simplifies the definition, but also avoids difficulties in infinite settings. The next result establishes that HT-hyperequivalence interpretations precisely characterize relativized hyperequivalence.
Theorem 4
Two propositional theories Γ 1 , Γ 2 are relativized hyperequivalent wrt. A + and A − if and only if they coincide on their HT-hyperequivalence interpretations wrt. A + and A − , sym-
Proof
In the following, we will use the following notational simplification: For any set of atoms X, we write X + for X| A + , and X − for X| A − . For the only-if direction suppose Γ 1
and towards a contradiction assume that E
Let Γ = Y + and observe that in both cases Y is not an answer set of 
is an HT-model of every formula of the
and towards a contradiction assume that Γ 1
such that Y is not an answer set of Γ 2 ∪ Γ (the other case is symmetric). Then, (Y, Y ) is an equivalence interpretation of both, Γ 1 and Γ, and
as witnessed by (X, Y ) |= Γ 2 , and thus
Consequently, (X ′ , Y ) |= Γ 1 ∪ Γ, and since X ′ ⊂ Y , this contradicts our assumption that Y is an answer set of Γ 1 ∪ Γ, and proves Γ 1
Like in the logic programming setting, the framework obtained by the consideration of relativized hyperequivalence interpretations provides a general unified characterization of semantic characterizations of equivalence notions. In other words, the notions of equivalence considered in the previous subsection are obtained as special cases. For this purpose, one needs to refer to the universal alphabet (respectively signature), denoted by A, explicitely. Then, by definition, setting A + = A − = ∅ amounts to answer-set equivalence, A + = A − = A yields strong equivalence, and A + = A, A − = ∅ characterizes uniform equivalence. The latter is not by definition but follows from two simple observations: every set of facts over A is a A-∅-theory, and every A-∅-theory is a factual theory modulo formulas of the form ⊥ → φ, which are tautologies in HT.
Corollary 2
Given two propositional theories Γ 1 and Γ 2 over L ⊆ A, the following propositions are equivalent for e ∈ {a, s, u}, A
and A − (u) = ∅:
In these particular cases, not only the notions of equivalence but also the characteristic semantic structures coincide, i.e., relativized hyperequivalence interpretations coincide with the respective characteristic sets of equivalence interpretations.
Proposition 6
Let Γ be a propositional theory over L ⊆ A, and let e ∈ {a, s, u}, A
A − (e) (Γ).
Proof
First consider answer-set equivalence, i.e., e = a and A + = A − = ∅. Then for any HT-
is thereclosed in E s (Γ) and X = ∅. The former follows from the first condition in Definition 9 since Y | A + = ∅, and the latter from the second condition in Definition 9, i.e., from the existence of an
Turning to strong equivalence, let e = s and A + = A − = A. Then for any HT-
The former follows from the first condition in Definition 9 since Y | A = Y , and the latter from the second condition in Definition 9, i.e., from the existence of an
. Eventually consider uniform equivalence, i.e., e = u, A + = A, and A − = ∅. In this
Note that this are exactly the requirements
Moreover, a setting where A + = A − is termed relativized strong equivalence, and A − = ∅ denotes relativized uniform equivalence. A further remark is in place, however. While we proved for uniform equivalence of propositional theories, that it is indifferent to whether we restrict additions (contexts) to sets of atoms or whether we allow for factual theories, A-∅-theories syntactically do not encompass factual theories, since negation, i.e., formulas of the form a → ⊥, are not permitted. One question that this raises is: would allowing factual theories as contexts make a difference for relativized notions of uniform equivalence?
The answer is by inspection of the proof of Theorem 4 in connection with Proposition 4 and Proposition 5. Recall that the propositions have been stated for extended A + -A − -theories. Therefore, the only-if direction of Theorem 4 also holds for extended A + -A − -theories. Since the if direction just referred to A + -A − -theories (which, trivially, are extended A + -A − -theories too), we obtain the following. Thus, also relativized uniform equivalence is independent of whether sets of atoms or factual theories are permitted as contexts. More generally, for any notion of relativized hyperequivalence, factual theories over A + can be allowed in the context without altering the notion of equivalence captured. This holds essentially due to Proposition 4, which generalizes Lemma 1 (Lemma 5 in (Pearce and Valverde 2004) ) in this respect. A final result establishes, that the notion of relativized hyperequivalence which has been introduced in this section is a proper generalization of the respective logic programming version to the more general case of propositional theories under answer-set semantics. It is a straight forward consequence of Theorem 4, since the A + -A − -theories in the proof of the if direction consist of formulas corresponding to rules with heads restricted to positive atoms from A + and body atoms from A − . Let us say that two propositional programs Π 1 and Π 2 are relativized hyperequivalent wrt. A + and A − in the logic programming sense, in symbols Π 1
Corollary 3
A + A − ≡ lp Π 2 , if and only if Π 1 ∪ Π ≡ a Π 2 ∪ Π for any program Π, such that H − (r) = ∅, H + (r) ⊆ A + , and B(r) ⊆ A − , for all r ∈ Π.
Corollary 4
Given two programs Π 1 and Π 2 , let A + and A − be sets of propositional variables. Then,
Generalization to First-Order Theories
Since the characterizations, in particular of uniform equivalence, presented in the previous section capture also infinite theories, they pave the way for generalizing this notion of equivalence to non-ground settings without any finiteness restrictions. In this section we study first-order theories.
As first-order theories we consider sets of sentences (closed formulas) of a first-order signature L = F , P in the sense of classical first-order logic. Hence, F and P are pairwise disjoint sets of function symbols and predicate symbols with an associated arity, respectively. Elements of F with arity 0 are called object constants. A 0-ary predicate symbol is a propositional constant. Formulas are constructed as usual and variable-free formulas or theories are called ground. A sentence is said to be factual if it is built using connectives ∧, ∨, ∃, ∀, and ¬ (i.e., implications of the form φ → ⊥), only. A theory Γ is factual if every sentence of Γ has this property. The abbreviations introduced for propositional formulas carry over: φ ≡ ψ for (φ → ψ) ∧ (ψ → φ); ¬φ for φ → ⊥; and ⊤ for ⊥ → ⊥.
Static Quantified Logic of Here-and-There
Semantically we refer to the static quantified version of here-and-there with decidable equality as captured axiomatically by the system QHT s = (Pearce and Valverde 2006; Lifschitz et al. 2007; Pearce and Valverde 2008) . It is characterized by Kripke models of two worlds with a common universe (hence static) that interpret function symbols in the same way.
More formally, consider a first-order interpretation I of a first-order signature L on a universe U. We denote by L I the extension of L obtained by adding pairwise distinct names c ε as object constants for the objects in the universe, i.e., for each ε ∈ U. We write C U for the set {c ε | ε ∈ U} and identify I with its extension to L I given by I(c ε ) = ε. Furthermore, let t I denote the value assigned by I to a ground term t (of signature L I ), let L F denote the restriction of L to function symbols (thus including object constants), and let B P,CU be the set of atomic formulas built using predicates from P and constants C U .
We represent a first-order interpretation I of L on U as a pair I| LF , I| CU , 3 where I| LF is the restriction of I on function symbols, and I| CU is the set of atomic formulas from B P,CU which are satisfied in I. Correspondingly, classical satisfaction of a sentence φ by a first-order interpretation I| LF , I| CU is denoted by I| LF , I| CU |= φ. We also define a subset relation for first-order interpretations I 1 , I 2 of L on U (ie., over the same domain) by
The satisfaction of a sentence φ of signature L I by a QHT-interpretation M = I, J, K (a QHT-model) is defined as:
is an answer set of Γ iff M = I, K, K is a QEL-model of a theory Γ. In analogy to the propositional case, we will use the following simple properties. If I, J, K |= φ then I, K, K |= φ; and I, J, K |= ¬φ iff I, K |= ¬φ.
Characterizing Equivalence by QHT-countermodels
We aim at generalizing uniform equivalence for first-order theories, in its most liberal form, which means wrt. factual theories. For this purpose, we first lift Lemma 1.
Lemma 3
Let φ be a factual sentence. If I, J, K |= φ and
Proof
The proof is by induction on the formula structure of φ. Let M = I, J, K , M |= φ, and For the induction step, assume that M |= φ implies M ′ |= φ, for any sentence of depth n−1, and let φ be a sentence of depth n. We show that M |= φ implies M ′ |= φ. Suppose φ is the conjunction or disjunction of two sentences φ 1 and φ 2 . Then φ 1 and φ 2 are sentences of depth n − 1. Hence, M |= φ 1 implies M ′ |= φ 1 , and the same for φ 2 . Therefore, if M models both or one of the sentences then so does M ′ , which implies M |= φ implies M ′ |= φ if φ is the conjunction or disjunction of two sentences. As for implication, since φ is factual we just need to consider the case where φ is of the form φ 1 → ⊥, i.e., ¬φ 1 . Then, M |= ¬φ 1 iff I, K |= ¬φ 1 iff M ′ |= ¬φ 1 . This proves M |= φ implies M ′ |= φ if φ is an implication with ⊥ as its consequence. Eventually, consider a quantified sentence φ, i.e., φ is of the form ∀xφ 1 (x) or ∃xφ 1 (x). In this case, M |= φ implies M |= φ 1 (c ε ) and I, K |= φ 1 (c ε ), for all ε ∈ U, respectively M |= φ 1 (c ε ), for some ε ∈ U, in case of existential quantification. Since each of the sentences φ 1 (c ε ) is of depth n − 1, the same is true for M ′ by assumption, i.e., M ′ |= φ 1 (c ε ) and I, K |= φ 1 (c ε ), for all ε ∈ U, respectively M ′ |= φ 1 (c ε ), for some ε ∈ U. It follows that M |= φ implies M ′ |= φ also for quantified sentences φ of depth n, and therefore, for any sentence φ of depth n. This proves the claim.
The different notions of closure naturally extend to (sets of) QHT-interpretations. In particular, a total QHT-interpretation M = I, K, K is called total-closed in a set S of QHT-interpretations if I, J, K ∈ S for every J ⊆ K. A QHT-interpretation I, J, K is closed in a set S of QHT-interpretations if I, J ′ , K ∈ S for every J ⊆ J ′ ⊆ K, and it is there-closed in S if I, K, K ∈ S and I, J ′ , K ∈ S for every J ⊆ J ′ ⊂ K.
The first main result lifts the characterization of uniform equivalence for theories by HT-countermodels to the first-order case.
Theorem 5
Two first-order theories are uniformly equivalent iff they have the same sets of there-closed QHT-countermodels.
The proof idea is the same as in the propositional case, thus for space reasons the proof is skipped. The same applies to Theorem 6 and Proposition 7 (cf. (Fink 2009 ) for full proofs).
We next turn to an alternative characterization by a mixture of QHT-models and QHTcountermodels as in the propositional case. A QHT-countermodel I, J, K of a theory Γ is called QHT here-countermodel of Γ if I, K |= Γ. A QHT-interpretation I, J, K is an QHT equivalence-interpretation of a theory Γ, if it is a total QHT-model of Γ or a QHT here-countermodel of Γ. In slight abuse of notation, we reuse the notation S e , S ∈ {C, E} and e ∈ {c, a, s, u}, for respective sets of QHT-interpretations, and arrive at the following formal result:
Theorem 6
Two theories coincide on their QHT-countermodels iff they have the same QHT equivalenceinterpretations, in symbols
As a consequence of these two main results, we obtain an elegant, unified formal characterization of the different notions of equivalence for first-order theories under generalized answer-set semantics.
Corollary 5
Given two first-order theories Γ 1 and Γ 2 , the following propositions are equivalent for e ∈ {c, a, s, u}: Γ 1 ≡ e Γ 2 ; C e (Γ 1 ) = C e (Γ 2 ); E e (Γ 1 ) = E e (Γ 2 ).
Moreover, lifting the characterization of HT-countermodels provided in Proposition 2 to the first-order setting, allows us to prove a property, which simplifies the treatment of extended signatures.
For QHT-models it is known that M |= Γ implies M | L |= Γ (cf. e.g., Proposition 3 in (de Bruijn et al. 2007) 
The converse direction holds for totality preserving restrictions (the proof appeared in (Fink 2008) and can also be found in (Fink 2009 )):
Note that this property carries over to QHT-models, i.e., M | L |= Γ implies M |= Γ, if M | L is the restriction of M to L and this restriction is totality preserving. Otherwise, by the above result M |= Γ would imply M | L |= Γ. We remark that in (Fink 2008) it is erroneously stated informally that this property does not hold for QHT-models, however the counter-example given there is flawed (Example 5 in (Fink 2008) ).
Relativized Hyperequivalence for First-Order Theories
In this section we extend the notion of relativized hyperequivalence to first-order theories. For this purpose, we distinguish positive and negative occurrences of predicates in sentences. More precisely, the occurrence of a predicate p in a sentence φ is called positive if φ is implication free, if p occurs in the consequent of an implication in φ, or if φ is of the form (φ 1 → φ 2 ) → φ 3 and p occurs in φ 1 . An occurrence of p is called negative if p occurs in the antecedent of an implication. The notion of positive and negative occurrence is again extended to (sub-)sentences in the obvious way.
Let Γ be a first-order theory over 
Definition 10
Two first-order theories
The properties proven for HT-interpretations and extended A + -A − -theories in the propositional case, carry over to QHT-interpretations and extended L + -L − -theories in a straight forward manner.
Proposition 8
Consider an extended first-order L + -L − -theory Γ, and a QHT-interpretation I, J, K .
The proof is lengthy and does not convey particular new insights, therefore it is skipped here (cf. (Fink 2009)) . The main differences to the propositional case concern the treatment of equality of terms and that quantification has to be taken into account. The former depends solely on the interpretation part I, which is the same for the QHT-interpretations under consideration, and thus has no further influence on the argument. The latter, is a further case to be considered in the inductive argument, however one that reduces easily to the respective induction hypotheses. The remainder simply mirrors the propositional case, with the polarity being considered on the predicate level, rather than for propositional variables. The same holds for the proofs of the remaining results in this section.
Proposition 9
Consider an extended first-order L + -L − -theory Γ, and a total QHT-interpretation I, K, K .
Having lifted the essential properties to the case of L + -L − -theories, it comes at no surprise that we end up with respective closure conditions for QHT-equivalence interpretations.
Definition 11
Given a first-order theory Γ over L, sets of predicate symbols
and a QHT-interpretation M = I, J, K , we say that
Also the characteristic structures for a semantic characterization are defined in straightforward analogy.
Definition 12
A QHT-interpretation M = I, J, K is a QHT-hyperequivalence interpretation wrt. L + and L − of a first-order theory Γ iff I, K, K is L + -total and there exists a QHT-inter-
The set of QHT-hyperequivalence interpretations wrt.
. Eventually, we arrive at a characterization of relativized hyperequivalence for general first-order theories under answer-set semantics, where contexts are restricted on the predicate level.
Theorem 8
Two first-order theories Γ 1 , Γ 2 are relativized hyperequivalent wrt. L + and L − if and only if they coincide on their QHT-hyperequivalence interpretations wrt.
. In the same way as for propositional theories, the prominent notions of equivalence are obtained as special cases, and the framework gives rise to relativized notions of strong and uniform equivalence for general first-order theories under answer-set semantics. Also in analogy, the role of factual theories is governed by Proposition 8, yielding the following: 
Non-ground Logic Programs
In this section we apply the characterizations obtained for first-order theories to non-ground logic programs under various extended semantics-compared to the traditional semantics in terms of Herbrand interpretations. For a proper treatment of these issues, further background is required and introduced (succinctly, but at sufficient detail) below. In non-ground logic programming, we restrict to a function-free first-order signature L = F , P (i.e., F contains object constants only) without equality. A program Π (over L) is a set of rules (over L) of the form (1). A rule r is safe if each variable occurring in H(r) ∪ B − (r) also occurs in B + (r); a rule r is ground, if all atoms occurring in it are ground. A program is safe, respectively ground, if all of its rules enjoy this property. Given Π over L and a universe U, let L U be the extension of L as before. The grounding of Π wrt. U and an interpretation I| LF of L F on U is defined as the set grd U (Π, I| LF ) of ground rules obtained from r ∈ Π by (i) replacing any constant c in r by c ε such that I| LF (c) = ε, and (ii) all possible substitutions of elements in C U for the variables in r.
Adapted from (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1991) , the reduct of a program Π with respect to a first-order interpretation I = I| LF , I| CU on universe U, in symbols grd U (Π, I| LF ) I , is given by the set of rules
obtained from rules in grd U (Π, I| LF ) of the form (1), such that I |= a i for all k < i ≤ l and I |= b j for all m < j ≤ n.
A first-order interpretation I satisfies a rule r, I |= r, iff I |= Γ r , where Γ r = ∀ x(β r → α r ), x are the free variables in r, α r is the disjunction of H(r), and β r is the conjunction of B(r). It satisfies a program Π, symbolically I |= Π, iff it satisfies every r ∈ Π, i.e., if I |= Γ Π , where Γ Π = r∈Π Γ r .
A first-order interpretation I is called a generalized answer set of Π iff it satisfies grd U (Π, I| LF ) I and it is subset minimal among the interpretations of L on U with this property.
Traditionally, only Herbrand interpretations are considered as the answer sets of a logic program. The set of all (object) constants occurring in Π is called the Herbrand universe of Π, symbolically H. If no constant appears in Π, then H = {c}, for an arbitrary constant c. A Herbrand interpretation is any interpretation I of L H = H, P on H interpreting object constants by identity, id , i.e., I(c) = id (c) = c for all c ∈ H. A Herbrand interpretation I is an ordinary answer set of Π iff it is subset minimal among the interpretations of L H on H satisfying grd H (Π, id ) I .
Furthermore, an extended Herbrand interpretation is an interpretation of L on U ⊇ F interpreting object constants by identity. An extended Herbrand interpretation I is an open answer set (Heymans et al. 2007 ) of Π iff it is subset minimal among the interpretations of L on U satisfying grd U (Π, id )
I .
Note that since we consider programs without equality, we semantically resort to the logic QHT s , which results from QHT s = by dropping the axioms for equality. Concerning Kripke models, however, in slight abuse of notation, we reuse QHT-models as defined for the general case. A QHT-interpretation M = I, J, K is called an (extended) QHT Herbrand interpretation, if I, K is an (extended) Herbrand interpretation. Given a program Π, I, K is a generalized answer set of Π iff I, K, K is a QEL-model of Γ Π , and I, K is an open, respectively ordinary, answer set of Π iff I, K, K is an extended Herbrand, respectively Herbrand, QEL-model of Γ Π . Notice that the static interpretation of constants introduced by Item (i) of the grounding process is essential for this correspondences in terms of QHT s . Abusing notation, we further on identify Π and Γ Π . As already mentioned for propositional programs, uniform equivalence is usually understood wrt. sets of ground facts (i.e., ground atoms). Obviously, uniform equivalence wrt. factual theories implies uniform equivalence wrt. ground atoms. We show the converse direction (lifting Theorem 2 in (Pearce and Valverde 2004) , for a proof see (Fink 2009) ).
Proposition 10
Given two programs Π 1 , Π 2 , then Π 1 ≡ u Π 2 iff (Π 1 ∪ A) ≡ a (Π 2 ∪ A), for any set of ground atoms A.
Thus, there is no difference whether we consider uniform equivalence wrt. sets of ground facts or factual theories. Since one can also consider sets of clauses, i.e. disjunctions of atomic formulas and their negations, which is a more suitable representation of facts according to the definition of program rules in this article, we adopt the following terminology. A rule r is called a fact if B(r) = ∅, and a factual program is a set of facts. Then, by our result Π 1 ≡ u Π 2 holds for programs Π 1 , Π 2 iff (Π 1 ∪ Π) ≡ a (Π 2 ∪ Π), for any factual program Π.
Uniform Equivalence under Herbrand Interpretations
The results in the previous section generalize the notion of uniform equivalence to programs under generalized open answer-set semantics and provide alternative characterizations for other notions of equivalence. They apply to programs under open answer-set semantics and ordinary answer-set semantics, when QHT-interpretations are restricted to extended Herbrand interpretations and Herbrand interpretations, respectively. In order to capture strong and uniform equivalence under ordinary answer-set semantics correctly, interpretations under the Standard Name Assumption (SNA) have to be considered, accounting for the potential extensions. For programs Π 1 and Π 2 and e ∈ {c, a, s, u}, we use Π 1 ≡ non-total QHT-model of Π 1 . Observing that M ′′ is an Herbrand QHT-model over L ′ and L ′ ⊇ L, we conclude that M ′′ is a maximal non-total extended Herbrand QHT-model of Π 2 , but not of Π 1 . Contradiction.
Conclusion
Countermodels in equilibrium logic have recently been used by Cabalar and Ferraris (2007) to show that propositional disjunctive logic programs with negation in the head are strongly equivalent to propositional theories, and by to generate a minimal logic program for a given propositional theory.
By means of QEL, in ), the notion of strong equivalence has been extended to first-order theories with equality, under the generalized notion of answer set we have adopted. QEL has also been shown to capture open answer-sets (Heymans et al. 2007 ) and generalized open answer-sets (Heymans et al. 2008) , and is a promising framework for hybrid knowledge bases, providing a unified semantics encompassing classical logic as well as disjunctive logic programs under the answer-set semantics (de Bruijn et al. 2007 ).
Our results extend these foundations for the research of semantic properties in these generalized settings. First, they complete the picture concerning the prominent notions of equivalence by making uniform equivalence amenable to these generalized settings without any finiteness restrictions, in particular on the domain. In addition, the developed notion of relativized hyperequivalence interpretation provides a means for the study of more specific semantic relationships under generalized answer-set semantics. Thus, a general and uniform model-theoretic framework is achieved for the characterization of various notions of equivalence studied in ASP. We have also shown that for finite programs, i.e., those programs solvers are able to deal with, infinite domains do not cause the problems observed for infinite propositional programs, when dealing with uniform equivalence in terms of HT-models of the grounding.
An intersting theoretical problem for further work is to consider equivalences and correspondence under projections of answer sets Oetsch et al. 2007; Pührer et al. 2008; Pührer and Tompits 2009) . It is not difficult to apply existing techniques to our characterizations in order to obtain characterizations for projective versions of uniform and strong equivalence, and for relativized notions thereof, i.e., as long as the same alphabet is permitted for positive and negative occurrences in the context. However, it is not trivial to characterize projective versions of relativized hyperequivalence in the general case, something which also has not been considered for propositional logic programs so far.
Concerning the application of our results, there is ongoing work on combining ontologies and nonmonotonic rules, an important issue in knowledge representation and reasoning for the Semantic Web. The study of equivalences and correspondences under an appropriate (unifying) semantics, such as the generalizations of answer-set semantics characterized by QEL, constitute a highly relevant topic for research in this application domain (Fink and Pearce 2009 ). Like for Datalog, uniform equivalence may serve investigations on query equivalence and query containment in these hybrid settings, and due to the combination of two formalisms, more specific notions of equivalence are needed to obtain the intended notions of correspondence. While our characterizations serve as a basis for these investigations, in particular the simplified treatment of extended signatures for (equivalence) interpretations is expected to be of avail, when considering separate alphabets.
On the foundational level, our results raise the interesting question whether extensions of intuitionistic logics that allow for a direct characterization of countermodels, or equivalence interpretations, would provide a more suitable formal apparatus for the study of (at least notions of uniform) equivalences in ASP.
